Term limits and electoral accountability

Michael Smart and Daniel Sturm

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: Periodic elections are the main instrument through which voters can hold politicians accountable. From this perspective term limits, which restrict voters’ ability to reward politicians with re-election, appear counterproductive. We show that despite the disciplining effect of elections, term limits can be ex ante welfare improving from the perspective of voters. By reducing the value of holding office term limits can induce politicians to implement policies that are closer to their private preferences. Such “truthful” behavior by incumbents in turn results in better screening of incumbents. We show that the combination of these two effects can strictly increase the utility of voters.

Keywords: Political Agency; Accountability; Term Limits (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 33 pages
Date: 2006-12
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (22)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Term limits and electoral accountability (2013)
Working Paper: Term limits and electoral accountability (2013)
Working Paper: Term Limits and Electoral Accountability (2006)
Working Paper: Term Limits and Electoral Accountability (2004)
Working Paper: Term limits and electoral accountability (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:lserod:19771

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