Term Limits and Electoral Accountability

Daniel Sturm and Michael Smart

No 4272, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: This Paper analyses the impact of term limits in a political agency model. We find that term limits reduce the value of holding office. This reduction in the re-election incentive can induce politicians to implement policies that are closer to their own private preferences. Such ?truthful? behaviour by incumbents will in turn result in better screening of incumbents whose preferences do not correspond to voters? preferences. We show that these effects can make a two-term limit, which is the empirically most frequent restriction on tenure, ex ante welfare-improving from the perspective of voters. We present evidence from gubernatorial elections that the model?s main empirical implication is supported by the data.

Keywords: Political agency; Accountability; Term limits (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

Downloads: (external link)
https://cepr.org/publications/DP4272 (application/pdf)
CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org

Related works:
Journal Article: Term limits and electoral accountability (2013)
Working Paper: Term limits and electoral accountability (2013)
Working Paper: Term Limits and Electoral Accountability (2006)
Working Paper: Term limits and electoral accountability (2006)
Working Paper: Term limits and electoral accountability (2004)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:4272

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
https://cepr.org/publications/DP4272

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers Centre for Economic Policy Research, 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().