What do unions do to executive compensation?
Rafael Gomez () and
LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library
In this paper we estimate the relation between union presence within a firm and CEO compensation, using a unique panel of publicly listed companies for the period 1992 to 2001. We find that, on average, union presence: 1) is significantly associated with lower levels of total CEO compensation; 2) affects the mix of CEO compensation by providing higher levels of base pay but much lower stock option values; 3) lowers dispersion across the major components of CEO remuneration and 4) does not significantly reduce the performance sensitivity of CEO compensation as compared to non-union firms. These results are consistent with several models of union influence.
Keywords: Unions; CEO compensation; implicit regulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J33 M54 J51 M52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 35 pages
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http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/19865/ Open access version. (application/pdf)
Working Paper: What Do Unions Do to Executive Compensation? (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:lserod:19865
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