What Do Unions Do to Executive Compensation?
Rafael Gomez () and
CEP Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Performance, LSE
We estimate the relation between union presence and executive compensation using a unique panel of executives in publicly listed US firms during the period 1992-2001. We find evidence that union presence is associated with lower levels of total executive compensation. We find this union effect to be primarily the result of substantially lower stock option awards, and to a lesser extent due to lower cash pay. Moreover, the negative relation between unionization and executive remuneration becomes larger at the higher end of the conditional distribution of executive remuneration. We also find that the elasticity of cash pay to financial performance is similar across unionized and non-unionized firms, and that union presence is associated with a more compressed intra-firm and inter-firm executive compensation structure.
Keywords: Unions; executive compensation; Implicit regulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G30 J33 J51 M52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec and nep-fin
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Working Paper: What do unions do to executive compensation? (2006)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cep:cepdps:dp0720
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in CEP Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Performance, LSE
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().