Monitoring colleagues at work: profit-sharing, employee ownership, broad-based stock options and workplace performance in the United States

Douglas Kruse, Joseph Blasi and Richard Freeman

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: This study seeks to increase our understanding of worker reactions to shirking by analyzing two new questions on shirking from the 2002 General Social Science Survey (GSS). We developed the questions in order to illuminate the factors that enable some shared capitalist enterprises to overcome the free rider or 1/N dilemma. Our guiding principle is the notion that for profit-sharing, worker ownership, and broad-based stock options to produce economic benefits, workers must “buy into” shared arrangements and create a workplace culture that discourages shirking.

JEL-codes: J01 R14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 39 pages
Date: 2004-08
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/19943/ Open access version. (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Monitoring Colleagues at Work: Profit-Sharing, Employee Ownership, Broad-Based Stock Options and Workplace Performance in the United States (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:lserod:19943

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