Publicity of debate and the incentive to dissent: evidence from the US federal reserve

Ellen Meade and David Stasavage

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: When central banks are transparent about their decision making, there may be clear benefits in terms of credibility, policy effectiveness, and improved democratic accountability. While recent literature has focused on all of these advantages of transparency, in this paper we consider one potential cost: the possibility that publishing detailed records of deliberations will make members of a monetary policy committee more reluctant to offer dissenting opinions. Drawing on the recent literature on expert advisors with ¿career concerns¿, we construct a model that compares incentives for members of a monetary policy committee to voice dissent when deliberations occur in public, and when they occur in private. We then test the implications of the model using an original dataset based on deliberations of the Federal Reserve¿s Federal Open Market Committee, asking whether the FOMC¿s decision in 1993 to begin releasing full transcripts of its meetings has altered incentives for participants to voice dissenting opinions. We find this to be the case with regard to both opinions on shortterm interest rates and on the ¿bias¿ for future policy.

Keywords: transparency; central banking; career concerns (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E42 E58 E65 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 33 pages
Date: 2004-01
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/19994/ Open access version. (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Publicity of Debate and the Incentive to Dissent: Evidence from the US Federal Reserve (2008)
Journal Article: Publicity of Debate and the Incentive to Dissent: Evidence from the US Federal Reserve (2008)
Working Paper: Publicity of Debate and the Incentive to Dissent: Evidence from the US Federal Reserve (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:lserod:19994

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