The premiss-based approach to judgment aggregation

Franz Dietrich and Philippe Mongin

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: In the framework of judgment aggregation, we assume that some formulas of the agenda are singled out as premisses, and that both Independence (formula-wise aggregation) and Unanimity Preservation hold for them. Whether premiss-based aggregation thus defined is compatible with conclusion-based aggregation, as defined by Unanimity Preservation on the non-premisses, depends on how the premisses are logically connected, both among themselves and with other formulas. We state necessary and sufficient conditions under which the combination of both approaches leads to dictatorship (resp. oligarchy), either just on the premisses or on the whole agenda. Our analysis is inspired by the doctrinal paradox of legal theory and is arguably relevant to this field as well as political science and political economy. When the set of premisses coincides with the whole agenda, a limiting case of our assumptions, we obtain several existing results in judgment aggregation theory.

Keywords: ISI; Doctrinal paradox; Premiss-based and conclusion-based approach; Judgment aggregation; Impossibility theorems; Majority voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-03
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (50)

Published in Journal of Economic Theory, March, 2010, 145(2), pp. 562-582. ISSN: 1095-7235

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Related works:
Journal Article: The premiss-based approach to judgment aggregation (2010)
Working Paper: The Premiss-Based Approach to Judgment Aggregation (2010)
Working Paper: The premiss-based approach to judgment aggregation (2008)
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