Delay and deadlines: freeriding and information revelation in partnerships

Arthur Campbell, Florian Ederer and Johannes Spinnewijn

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: We study two sources of delay in teams: freeriding and lack of communication. Partners contribute to the value of a common project, but have private information about the success of their own efforts. When the deadline is far away, unsuccessful partners freeride on each others' efforts. When the deadline draws close, successful partners stop revealing their success to maintain their partners' motivation. We derive comparative statics results for common team performance measures and find that the optimal deadline maximizes productive efforts while avoiding unnecessary delays. Welfare is higher when information is only privately observable rather than revealed to the partnership.

JEL-codes: D82 D83 M54 O30 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-hrm, nep-mic and nep-pke
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (26)

Published in American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, May, 2014, 6(2), pp. 163-204. ISSN: 1945-7669

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Related works:
Journal Article: Delay and Deadlines: Freeriding and Information Revelation in Partnerships (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:lserod:56861

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