Family firms

Mike Burkart, Fausto Panunzi and Andrei Shleifer

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: We present a model of succession in a firm owned and managed by its founder. The founder decides between hiring a professional manager or leaving management to his heir, as well as on what fraction of the company to float on the stock exchange. We assume that a professional is a better manager than the heir, and describe how the founder's decision is shaped by the legal environment. This theory of separation of ownership from management includes the Anglo-Saxon and the Continental European patterns of corporate governance as special cases, and generates additional empirical predictions consistent with cross-country evidence.

JEL-codes: F3 G3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-09-11
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (59)

Published in Journal of Finance, 11, September, 2003, 58(5), pp. 2167-2201. ISSN: 0022-1082

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http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/69549/ Open access version. (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Family Firms (2003)
Working Paper: Family Firms (2003)
Working Paper: Family Firms (2002)
Working Paper: Family firms (2002)
Working Paper: Family Firms (2002)
Working Paper: Family Firms (2002)
Working Paper: Family Firms (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:lserod:69549

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