Family Firms

Andrei Shleifer, Fausto Panunzi and Mike Burkart

No 3234, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: We present a model of succession in a firm controlled and managed by its founder. The founder decides between hiring a professional manager or leaving management to his heir, as well as on how much, if any, of the shares to float on the stock exchange. We assume that a professional is a better manager than the heir, and describe how the founder?s decision is shaped by the legal environment. Specifically, we show that, in legal regimes that successfully limit the expropriation of minority shareholders, the widely held professionally managed corporation emerges as the equilibrium outcome. In legal regimes with intermediate protection, management is delegated to a professional, but the family stays on as large shareholders to monitor the manager. In legal regimes with the weakest protection, the founder designates his heir to manage and ownership remains inside the family. This theory of separation of ownership from management includes the Anglo-Saxon and the Continental European patterns of corporate governance as special cases, and generates additional empirical predictions consistent with cross-country evidence.

Keywords: Corporate governance; Law and finance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cfn
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (34)

Downloads: (external link)
https://cepr.org/publications/DP3234 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Family Firms (2003)
Working Paper: Family firms (2003)
Working Paper: Family Firms (2003)
Working Paper: Family firms (2002)
Working Paper: Family Firms (2002)
Working Paper: Family Firms (2002)
Working Paper: Family Firms (2002)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3234

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
https://cepr.org/publications/DP3234

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX, UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CEPR ().