Institutions as constraints and resources: explaining cross-national divergence in performance management

Virginia Doellgast and David Marsden

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: This article compares performance management practices in call centres from four telecommunications firms in the UK, France, Denmark, and Germany. Findings show that different combinations of institutional constraints, such as strong job security protections, and participation resources supporting worker voice were influential in shaping choices among HRM policies to motivate and discipline workers. Performance management most closely approached a high involvement model where both constraints and resources were high: where worker representatives were able both to restrict management’s use of sanctions and to establish procedures that improved the perceived fairness of incentives. Findings contribute to debates concerning the role of contextual factors in the design and effectiveness of HRM.

Keywords: call centres; comparative HRM; performance management; telecommunications (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 18 pages
Date: 2019-04-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hrm and nep-ore
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Published in Human Resource Management Journal, 1, April, 2019, 29(2), pp. 199 - 216. ISSN: 0954-5395

Downloads: (external link)
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/89978/ Open access version. (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:lserod:89978

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library LSE Library Portugal Street London, WC2A 2HD, U.K.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by LSERO Manager ().