Climate Agreements in a Mitigation-Adaptation Game
Michael Finus () and
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Jean-Francois Jaques: UniversitÃ© Paris-Est
No 51/16, Department of Economics Working Papers from University of Bath, Department of Economics
We analyze the strategic interaction between mitigation (publicgood) and adaptation (private good) strategies in a climate agreement.We show that adaptation can lead to larger self-enforcing agreements,associated with higher global mitigation levels and welfare if it causesmitigation levels between different countries to be no longer strate-gic substitutes but complements. Thus, the fear that adaptation willreduce the incentives to mitigate carbon emissions may be unwar-ranted. We argue that our results extend to many important public goods. The purchase of private goods may not crowd out the provision of public goods, as this is commonly believed.
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Journal Article: Climate agreements in a mitigation-adaptation game (2018)
Working Paper: Climate agreements in a mitigation-adaptation game (2018)
Working Paper: Climate Agreements in a Mitigation-Adaptation Game (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eid:wpaper:58130
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