Climate Agreements in a Mitigation-Adaptation Game
Michael Finus () and
No 2016.17, Working Papers from FAERE - French Association of Environmental and Resource Economists
We study the strategic interaction between mitigation (public good) and adaptation (private good) strategies in a climate agreement. We show that these two strategies are strategic substitutes considering various definitions of substitutability. Moreover, adaptation may cause mitigation levels between different countries to be no longer strategic substitutes but complements. We analyze under which conditions this leads to more succesful self-enforcing agreements. We argue that our results extend to many important externality problems involving public goods.
Keywords: Climate Change; Mitigation-Adaptation Game; Public Good Agreements; Strategic Substitutes versus Complements (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D62 D74 H41 Q54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 55 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene, nep-env and nep-gth
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http://faere.fr/pub/WorkingPapers/Bayramoglu_Finus_Jacques_FAERE_WP2016.17.pdf First version, 2016 (application/pdf)
Journal Article: Climate agreements in a mitigation-adaptation game (2018)
Working Paper: Climate agreements in a mitigation-adaptation game (2018)
Working Paper: Climate Agreements in a Mitigation-Adaptation Game (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fae:wpaper:2016.17
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