Persistence of Civil Wars

Daron Acemoglu, Davide Ticchi () and Andrea Vindigni
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Andrea Vindigni: Princeton University

No 910, EIEF Working Papers Series from Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF)

Abstract: A notable feature of post-World War II civil wars is their very long average duration. We provide a theory of the persistence of civil wars. The civilian government can successfully defeat rebellious factions only by creating a relatively strong army. In weakly-institutionalized polities this opens the way for excessive influence or coups by the military. Civilian governments whose rents are largely unaffected by civil wars then choose small and weak armies that are incapable of ending insurrections. Our framework also shows that when civilian governments need to take more decisive action against rebels, they may be forced to build over-sized armies, beyond the size necessary for fighting the insurrection, as a commitment to not reforming the military in the future.

Pages: 20 pages
Date: 2009, Revised 2009-09
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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http://www.eief.it/files/2012/09/wp-10-persistence-of-civil-wars.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Persistence of Civil Wars (2010)
Working Paper: Persistence of Civil Wars (2009)
Working Paper: Persistence of Civil Wars (2009)
Working Paper: Persistence of Civil Wars (2009)
Working Paper: Persistence of civil wars (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eie:wpaper:0910

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