Persistence of Civil Wars

Daron Acemoglu, Davide Ticchi () and Andrea Vindigni ()
Additional contact information
Andrea Vindigni: University of Genova

No 4418, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: A notable feature of post-World War II civil wars is their very long average duration. We provide a theory of the persistence of civil wars. The civilian government can successfully defeat rebellious factions only by creating a relatively strong army. In weakly-institutionalized polities this opens the way for excessive influence or coups by the military. Civilian governments whose rents are largely unaffected by civil wars then choose small and weak armies that are incapable of ending insurrections. Our framework also shows that when civilian governments need to take more decisive action against rebels, they may be forced to build over-sized armies, beyond the size necessary for fighting the insurrection, as a commitment to not reforming the military in the future.

Keywords: political transitions; military; coups; commitment; civil wars; political economy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H2 N10 N40 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22 pages
Date: 2009-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-his
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Published - published in: Journal of the European Economic Association, 2010, 8 (2-3), 664-676

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Related works:
Journal Article: Persistence of Civil Wars (2010)
Working Paper: Persistence of Civil Wars (2009)
Working Paper: Persistence of Civil Wars (2009)
Working Paper: Persistence of Civil Wars (2009)
Working Paper: Persistence of civil wars (2009)
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