Lobbying with Two Audiences: Public vs Private Certification

Frederic Koessler

No 2006-12, Thema Working Papers from THEMA (Théorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), CY Cergy-Paris University, ESSEC and CNRS

Abstract: This note compares public and private information certification in a simple class of communication games with one sender and two receivers. It also emphasizes the role of belief consistency conditions in a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of such games.

Keywords: Certifiable information; cheap talk; consistency of beliefs (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm
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https://thema-cergy.eu/repec/pdf/2006-12.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Lobbying with two audiences: Public vs private certification (2008)
Working Paper: Lobbying with two audiences: Public vs private certification (2008)
Working Paper: Lobbying with two audiences: Public vs private certification (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ema:worpap:2006-12

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