EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Lobbying with two audiences: Public vs private certification

Frederic Koessler

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: This paper compares public and private information certification in a simple class of communication games with one sender and two receivers. It is shown that, contrary to the cheap talk setting of [Farrell, J., Gibbons, R., 1989. Cheap talk with two audiences. American Economic Review 79, 1214-1223], allowing certifiable statements excludes mutual discipline (i.e., full information revelation in public but not in private) but allows for mutual subversion (i.e., full information revelation in private but not in public). In the latter case, the sender is always better off with public communication, while in other situations he may prefer either private or public communication. Compared to the previous models of strategic information revelation the paper also emphasizes the role of the "common belief " consistency condition of the strong version of sequential equilibrium.

Keywords: Certifiable information; Cheap talk; Consistency of beliefs; Communication to multiple audiences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-05
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences, 2008, 55 (3), pp.305-314. ⟨10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2007.10.003⟩

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: Lobbying with two audiences: Public vs private certification (2008) Downloads
Working Paper: Lobbying with two audiences: Public vs private certification (2008)
Working Paper: Lobbying with Two Audiences: Public vs Private Certification (2006) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00754290

DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2007.10.003

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-22
Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00754290