CONDORCET MEETS BENTHAM

Marcus Pivato

No 2014-17, THEMA Working Papers from THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise

Abstract: We show that if the statistical distribution of utility functions in a population satisfies a certain condition, then a Condorcet winner will not only exist, but will also maximize the utilitarian social welfare function. We also show that, if people's utility functions are generated according to certain plausible random processes, then in a large population, this condition will be satisfied with very high probability. Thus, in a large population, the utilitarian outcome will be selected by any Condorcet consistent voting rule. In particular, it will be the subgame-perfect equilibrium outcome of several voting games.

Date: 2014
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-mic and nep-upt
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Related works:
Journal Article: Condorcet meets Bentham (2015)
Working Paper: Condorcet meets Bentham (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ema:worpap:2014-17

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