Condorcet meets Bentham
Marcus Pivato
Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2015, vol. 59, issue C, 58-65
Abstract:
We show that if the statistical distribution of utility functions in a population satisfies a certain condition, then a Condorcet winner will not only exist, but will also maximize the utilitarian social welfare function. We also show that, if people’s utility functions are generated according to certain plausible random processes, then in a large population, this condition will be satisfied with very high probability. Thus, in a large population, the utilitarian outcome will be selected by any Condorcet consistent voting rule.
Keywords: Utilitarian; Condorcet winner; Spatial voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)
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Working Paper: Condorcet meets Bentham (2015)
Working Paper: CONDORCET MEETS BENTHAM (2014) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:mateco:v:59:y:2015:i:c:p:58-65
DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.04.006
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