Risk Attitudes and Shirking on the Quality of Work under Monitoring: Evidence from a Real-Effort Task Experiment
SeEun Jung ()
No 2014-26, THEMA Working Papers from THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise
This paper studies the effects of risk attitudes on effort exerted under different monitoring schemes. Our design employs a theoretical model that relaxes the assumption that agents are risk neutral and investigates changes in the effort and quality of work as monitoring varies. The predictions of the theoretical model are tested in an original experimental setting in which levels of risk attitudes are measured and monitoring rates vary exogenously. Our results show that shirking decreases with risk aversion, being female, and monitoring. Moreover, monitoring is more effective at curtailing shirking behaviors with subjects who are less risk averse, although the size of the impact is small.
Keywords: Shirking; Monitoring; Risk under Uncertainty; Effort; Work Quality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D61 D81 D86 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe and nep-hrm
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ema:worpap:2014-26
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