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Designing Interrogations

Alessandro Ispano and Peter Vida ()
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Peter Vida: Université de Cergy-Pontoise, THEMA

No 2021-02, THEMA Working Papers from THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise

Abstract: We provide an equilibrium model of interrogations with two-sided asymmetric information. The suspect knows his status as guilty or innocent and the likely strength of law enforcers' evidence, which is informative about the suspect's status and may also disprove lies. We study the evidence strength standards for interro- gating and for drawing adverse inferences from silence that minimize prosecution errors. We consider scenarios where interrogations can be delegated. We describe the optimal mechanism under full commitment and a dynamic interrogation with two-sided information revelation implementing the optimum in equilibrium.

Keywords: lie; evidence; leniency; questioning; confession; law; prosecution; two-sided asymmetric information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D83 C72 K40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-mic
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ema:worpap:2021-02

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