Designing Interrogations

Alessandro Ispano and Péter Vida

No 2021-02, THEMA Working Papers from THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise

Abstract: We provide a model of interrogations with two-sided asymmetric information. The suspect knows his status as guilty or innocent and the likely strength of the law enforcer’s evidence, which is informative about the suspect’s status and may also disprove lies. We compare prosecution errors in the equilibrium of the one-shot interrogation and in the optimal mechanism under full commitment. We describe a back-and-forth interrogation with disclosure of the evidence that implements the optimum in equilibrium without any commitment.

Keywords: le; evidence; questioning; confession; law; prosecution; disclosure; persuasion; two-sided asymmetric information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 D83 K40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-mic
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Related works:
Journal Article: Designing Interrogations (2024)
Working Paper: Designing Interrogations (2024)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ema:worpap:2021-02

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