Good cop-bad cop: delegating interrogations

Alessandro Ispano and Péter Vida

No 2022-12, THEMA Working Papers from THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise

Abstract: A decision-maker who aims to find out the truth from a suspect delegates to an interrogator with possibly different preferences. The ideal interrogator is always biased, sometimes nicer and sometimes tougher. The decision-maker can further improve by delegating to a nicer interrogator when the evidence is weak and to a tougher interrogator when the evidence is strong. Provided the decision-maker does not learn the details of the interrogation, she may then equivalently retain authority over decisions. Sequential delegation with leniency for perjury can implement the optimal mechanism with full commitment.

Keywords: bias; questioning; lie; confession; authority; evidence. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 D83 K40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ema:worpap:2022-12

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