Managing European Conflicts through Devolution: Lessons from the League of Nations

Erin K. Jenne

No 65, EUI-RSCAS Working Papers from European University Institute (EUI), Robert Schuman Centre of Advanced Studies (RSCAS)

Abstract: This paper conducts comparative historical analysis on three cases of devolution in interwar Europe (Aland Islands, Danzig and Memel) to identify the conditions under which devolving autonomy to minority regions is most likely to mitigate internal tensions. The analysis indicates that both advocates and detractors of devolution overstate the effects of this technique on ethnic tensions on the ground. This is because internal conflict is less responsive to domestic institutions than it is the wider geopolitical environment. While institutions can have an effect on the long-term tendency to engage in separatism, nested security on the regional and hegemonic levels may be a determining factor in whether autonomous institutions have an inhibiting or exacerbating effect on separatist conflict.

Keywords: minorities (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-10-15
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/1814/14615 Full text (text/html)
http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/14615/RSCAS_2010_65.pdf Full text (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:erp:euirsc:p0265

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in EUI-RSCAS Working Papers from European University Institute (EUI), Robert Schuman Centre of Advanced Studies (RSCAS) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Valerio PAPPALARDO ().