The Execution of Delegated Powers after Lisbon. A timely analysis of the Regulatory Procedure with Scrutiny and its lessons for Delegated Acts

Michael Kaeding and Alan Hardacre

No 85, EUI-RSCAS Working Papers from European University Institute (EUI), Robert Schuman Centre of Advanced Studies (RSCAS)

Abstract: The history of comitology – the system of implementation committees that control the Commission in the execution of delegated powers – has been characterised by institutional tensions. The crux of these tensions has often been the role of the European Parliament and its quest to be granted powers equal to those of the Council. Over time this tension has been resolved through a series of inter-institutional agreements and Comitology Decisions, essentially giving the Parliament incremental increases in power. This process came to a head with the 2006 Comitology reform and the introduction of the regulatory procedure with scrutiny (RPS). After just over three years of experience with the RPS procedure, and having revised the entire acquis communautaire, the Treaty of Lisbon made has made it redundant through the creation of Delegated Acts (Article 290 TFEU), which gives the Parliament equal rights of oversight. This article aims to evaluate the practical implications that Delegated Acts will entail for the Parliament, principally by using the four years of experience with the RPS to better understand the challenges ahead. This analysis will be of interest to those following the study of comitology, formal and informal interinstitutional relations, and also to practitioners who will have to work with Delegated Acts in the future.

Keywords: European Parliament; comitology (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-11-15
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