Deadline Effects in Ultimatum Bargaining: An Experimental Study of Concession Sniping with Low or no Costs of Delay*

Werner Güth (), Maria Levati and Boris Maciejovsky

Papers on Strategic Interaction from Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group

Abstract: In this paper we report an experimental study of the ultimatum game in which subjects bargain for constant and slowly decreasing pies, over 3 and 11 rounds with either constant or alternating offers. With decreasing pies efficiency requires early agreements, whereas constant pies allow for late efficiency. Slowly decreasing pies are here captured by a 10%-decrease of total rewards from the first to the last round. While in the alternating offer bargaining mode roles are exchanged from round to round, in the constant role mode the same party is constantly proposing. Participants play all games with changing partners but keep their role as (initial) proposer or responder over the entire experiment. Our findings offer institutional advice, e.g. that conflict can be avoided by role alternation and time pressure.

Keywords: Ultimatum game; Conflict resolution; Decreasing pie; Sniping (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C90 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 19 pages
Date: 2001-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-mic
Note: This paper is part of the EU-TMR Research Network ENDEAR (FMRX-CT98-0238). We are indebted to Ben Greiner, Sylvia Schikora, and Volker Zieman for their research assistance.
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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