Are we nice(r) to nice(r) people? - An Experimental Analysis

Max Albert, Werner Güth (), Erich Kirchler and Boris Maciejovsky

Papers on Strategic Interaction from Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group

Abstract: We experimentally investigate whether individuals can reliably detect cooperators in an anonymous decision environment by allowing participants to condition their choices in an asymmetric prisoner's dilemma and a trust game (i) on their partner's donation share to a self-selected charity, and (ii) on whether their partner belongs to a group with high or low average donations (group affiliation). We find that high donators achieve a higher-than-average expected payoff by cooperating predominantly with other high donators. The group affiliation proved to be irrelevant.

Keywords: Game theory; Condidional Cooperation; Donation behaviour (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 C91 D3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

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Journal Article: Are we nice(r) to nice(r) people?—An experimental analysis (2007)
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