Wie Du mir, so ich Dir! - Ökonomische Theorie und Experiment am Beispiel der Reziprozität

Werner Güth (), Hartmut Kliemt and Stefan Napel

Papers on Strategic Interaction from Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group

Abstract: Economists usually treat human behavior as being determined by the shadow of the future, while most other social scientists point to the shadow of the past. This paper considers experimental evidence relevant to the controversy and tries to reconcile both explanations of human behavior with each other by integrating them in a unified evolu-tionary framework. The possible emergence and survival of intrinsically motivated resent-ment against being treated "unfairly" is analyzed as a case in point. The results shed light on the (in-)stability of different combinations of plain opportunism and social or ethical motives behind human behavior.

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:esi:discus:2002-19

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