The Timing of Bids in Internet Auctions: Market Design, Bidder Behavior, and Artificial Agents
Axel Ockenfels and
Alvin Roth ()
Papers on Strategic Interaction from Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group
Many bidders in eBay employ bidding strategies that involve late bids, incremental bids, or both. Based on field evidence, we discuss the manner in which late bids are caused both by sophisticated, strategic reasoning and by irrationality and inexperience, the interaction of late bidding and incremental bidding, and the relation between market design and artificial agent design.
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:esi:discus:2002-33
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