Information and Communication in Sequential Bargaining
Axel Ockenfels and
Papers on Strategic Interaction from Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group
In experimental bargaining with incomplete information, we vary the information distribution (symmetric and asymmetric), the direction of electronic pre-play communication (no, one-way, and two-way), and the electronic communication medium (email and video) Bargaining out-comes are influenced by the information and communication configurations, but not by the communication medium. In particular, sellers earn more when being informed about buyers' reservation prices (though they are willing to allocate more to buyers than theoretically pre-dicted), but less when communication opportunities are provided.
Keywords: sequential bargaining; incomplete information; communication; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 C91 C92 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:esi:discus:2003-09
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