Trust in cooperation or ability? – An experimental study on gender differences

Christiane Schwieren and Matthias Sutter

Papers on Strategic Interaction from Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group

Abstract: We examine experimentally two different types of trust: trust in another party’s cooperation and trust in ability. In the cooperation condition, player A sends x ? {0, X} to player B. The amount x is multiplied by c = 3, and B can return y ? {0,3x}. In the ability condition, c depends on B’s performance in a mathematical test, with c = 5/3/1 for above average/average/below average performance. We examine the influences of gender on economic decisions. We find that gender has a strong effect in the ability condition, but no significant effect in the cooperation condition.

Keywords: trust; gender; experiment; cooperation; ability; stereotypes (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30 pages
Date: 2003-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Trust in cooperation or ability? An experimental study on gender differences (2008)
Working Paper: Trust in cooperation or ability? An experimental study on gender differences (2007)
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