Trading Goods versus Sharing Money - An Experiment Testing Whether Fairness and Efficiency are Frame Dependent

Siegfried K. Berninghaus, Werner Gueth () and Annette Kirstein
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Werner Güth ()

Papers on Strategic Interaction from Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group

Abstract: Systematic experiments with distribution games (for a survey, see Roth, 1995) have shown that participants are strongly motivated by fairness and efficiency considerations. This evidence, however, results mainly from experimental designs asking directly for sharing monetary rewards. But even when not just one kind of monetary tokens is distributed efficiency and fairness are less influential. We investigate and confirm this frame dependency more systematically by comparing net-trade-proposals and payoff-proposals for the same exchange economy with two traders, two commodities and multi-period-negotiations.

Keywords: Nash-bargaining; fairness; bilateral exchange (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C78 C91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20 pages
Date: 2004-02
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Working Paper: Trading goods versus sharing money: an experiment testing whether fairness and efficiency are frame dependent (2003)
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