Bounded Rationality and Theory Absorption
Werner Güth () and
Hartmut Kliemt
Papers on Strategic Interaction from Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group
Abstract:
In plausible theories of bounded rationality actors are not stimulus-response machines but human beings. As such they are guided by theories that predict the course of the world and prescribe how they should try to intervene in that course. Since boundedly rational human beings cannot only observe but can also modify their theories, in particular if they are not satisfied with the results, a self-application of concepts of boundedly rational behavior to theory choice and an inquiry of theory absorption seems natural. The paper explores by means of specific examples some issues that are raised by combining the concept of satisficing behavior with that of theory absorption.
Pages: 16 pages
Date: 2004-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo and nep-hpe
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)
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