Satisficing in Financial Decision Making A Theoretical and Experimental Attempt to Explore Bounded Rationality
Gerlinde Fellner-Röhling (),
Werner Güth () and
Boris Maciejovsky
Papers on Strategic Interaction from Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group
Abstract:
In this paper, we apply the bounded rationality approach to an investment situation. In a simple setting where an investor decides between a riskless bond and a risky asset, we distinguish three aspiration levels: a lowest threshold which one wants to guarantee, the aspiration level given by investing all risk-free, and an even higher return level representing a real success. The ranges for such aspirations are naturally determined by the parameters. These three aspirations allow us to classify investors as actual or only potential satisficers, as well as risk shy or more open to risk. In the experiment, participants are first asked for their lowest and highest aspiration before investing. Thus, we can test whether they behave as predicted by their aspiration type. By presupposing specific cardinal utility functions, we also compare the bounded rationality approach to the rational choice-approach.
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 2005-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo, nep-exp and nep-fmk
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)
Downloads: (external link)
ftp://papers.econ.mpg.de/esi/discussionpapers/2005-23.pdf (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 500 Failed to connect to FTP server papers.econ.mpg.de: No such host is known.
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:esi:discus:2005-23
Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.econ.mpg. ... arch/ESI/discuss.php
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Papers on Strategic Interaction from Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Karin Richter ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).