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Democratic Defenses and Destabilisations

Werner Güth (), Hartmut Kliemt and Stefan Napel ()

Papers on Strategic Interaction from Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group

Abstract: The so-called paradox of democracy is approached as a variant of a more general class of so-called paradoxes of self-amendment. It is studied from a legal philosophy and a game theoretic point of view. Special attention is devoted to the risks and chances of inducing the foes of democracy to accept democratic rules by granting them a share in power. The upshot is that admitting democratic competition there are no foolproof defenses against democratic self-destabilisation.

Pages: 25 pages
Date: 2006-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
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Chapter: Democratic Defences and (De-)Stabilisations (2008)
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