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Satisficing in sales competition: experimental evidence

Siegfried Berninghaus, Werner Güth (), Maria Levati and Jianying Qiu

Papers on Strategic Interaction from Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group

Abstract: In a stochastic duopoly market, sellers must form state-specific aspirations expressing how much they want to earn given their expectations about the other's behavior. We define individually and mutually satisficing sales behavior for given individual beliefs and aspiration profiles. In a first experimental phase, whenever satis¯cing is not possible, beliefs or aspirations have to be adapted, or other strategy profiles must be found. In a second phase, participants are free to select non-satisficing sales profiles. The results reveal that most people are satisficers who, either mandatorily or deliberately, tend to adjust aspiration levels if they cannot be satisfied.

Keywords: Satisficing behavior; bounded rationality; duopoly (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C92 D43 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 31 pages
Date: 2006-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-com, nep-cse and nep-exp
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Satisficing in sales competition: experimental evidence (2009) Downloads
Working Paper: Satisficing in sales competition: experimental evidence (2007) Downloads
Working Paper: Satisficing in sales competition: experimental evidence (2007) Downloads
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