Social identity and trust - An experimental investigation

Werner Güth (), Maria Levati and Matteo Ploner

Papers on Strategic Interaction from Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group

Abstract: We experimentally examine how group identity affects trust behavior in an investment game. In one treatment, group identity is induced purely by minimal groups. In other treatments, group members are additionally related by outcome interdependence established in a prior public goods game. Moving from the standard investment game (where no group identity is prompted) to minimal group identity to two-dimensional group identity, we find no significant differences in trust decisions. However, trust is significantly and positively correlated with contribution decisions, suggesting that "social" trust is behaviorally important.

Keywords: Experiment; Investment game; Trust; Group identity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C92 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 34 pages
Date: 2007-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-cdm, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Journal Article: Social identity and trust--An experimental investigation (2008)
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