Does Development Aid Undermine Political Accountability? Leader and Constituent Responses to a Large-Scale Intervention
Raymond Guiteras and
Ahmed Mobarak ()
Working Papers from eSocialSciences
Comprehensive program evaluation requires capturing indirect effects of an intervention, such as changes in leadersâ€™ efforts and constituentsâ€™ attitudes towards leaders. We study political economy responses to a large-scale development program in Bangladesh, in which 346 communities consisting of 16,600 households were randomly assigned subsidies for sanitation investments. [Working Paper No. 489].
Keywords: General Equilibrium Effects of Interventions; Political Economy; Sanitation; households; subsidies; political accountability; leader; Intervention; rural Bangladesh; villages; foreign aid; public sector investment; crowding out (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Does Development Aid Undermine Political Accountability? Leader and Constituent Responses to a Large-Scale Intervention (2015)
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