Reducing rent seeking by providing wide public service

Amihai Glazer and Stef Proost

Working Papers of Department of Economics, Leuven from KU Leuven, Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB), Department of Economics, Leuven

Abstract: A winning coalition which sets policy cannot always ensure that members of the coalition will be the ones getting benefits. Different jurisdictions (including members of the winning coalition) may then engage in costly rent seeking. Maximizing the welfare of the winning coalition may therefore require providing services to jurisdictions which are not members of the winning coalition, thereby reducing rent seeking by members of the winning coalition. The paper shows how this mechanism can generate insuffcient supply of public services, and offers another explanation for the use of co-funding requirements by the central government.

Date: 2010-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm
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Related works:
Working Paper: Reducing Rent Seeking by Providing Wide Public Service (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ete:ceswps:ces10.31

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