Inefficiencies in regional commuting policy

Toon Vandyck () and Stef Proost

Working Papers of Department of Economics, Leuven from KU Leuven, Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB), Department of Economics, Leuven

Abstract: This paper discusses investments in transport infrastructure and incentives for commuting taxes in a multiregional setting. We study the horizontal and vertical interactions between governments. We identify incentives for strategic and tax exporting behavior that might lead to underinvestment in transport infrastructure. Furthermore, we show that the intensity of the strategic behavior is affected by geographic firm ownership structure, the number of labor-supplying regions and the revenue-sharing mechanism in the federation. A numerical example applies the insights on commuting in Belgium.

Date: 2011-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-geo and nep-ure
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https://lirias.kuleuven.be/bitstream/123456789/315564/1/DPS1118.pdf

Related works:
Journal Article: Inefficiencies in regional commuting policy (2012)
Working Paper: Regional government competition and incentives for commuting taxes and transport investments (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ete:ceswps:ces11.18

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