Regulating transmission in a spatial oligopoly: a numerical illustration for Belgium

Bert Willems and Guido Pepermans ()

Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series from KU Leuven, Department of Economics - Research Group Energy, Transport and Environment

Abstract: This paper introduces strategic behavior of the electricity network operator in a congested network with imperfect competition for generation. It models a two stage Stackelberg game. First, the network operator sets transmission prices, then generators set output and sales. Several scenarios for the generation market structure and the behavior of the network operator are compared numerically. The calibration of the numerical model is based on data of the Belgian electricity market.

Keywords: Regulation; Transmission; Electricity; Cournot; Numerical model; Security constraints; MPEC; loadflow; Belgium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D42 L13 L43 L94 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 35 pages
Date: 2003-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cmp, nep-com and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
https://lirias.kuleuven.be/bitstream/123456789/119382/1/ETE-WP-2003-14.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ete:etewps:ete0314

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series from KU Leuven, Department of Economics - Research Group Energy, Transport and Environment Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by library EBIB ().