How to determine fining behaviour in court? Game theoretical and empirical analysis

Sandra Rousseau and Billiet Carole ()
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Billiet Carole: Center for environmental law - University of Ghent

Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series from KU Leuven, Department of Economics - Research Group Energy, Transport and Environment

Abstract: We build a structural model to understand the fine set in court, which is described as the outcome of a two-stage game between defendant, public prosecutor and judge. The equilibrium fine depends on the harm caused, the costs to society and the probalility that the quilty party is punished. This fine influences the severity of prosecution and the defence expenditures. Next we empirically analyse the fines pronounced by the Court of Appeal in Ghent (Belgium) for water related criminal offences. We investigate whether the seriousness of the violation and past convictions, as well as some other characteristics, increase the penalty.

Pages: 39 pages
Date: 2005-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law and nep-reg
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ete:etewps:ete0510

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