The political economy of geographical indications

Koen Deconinck, Martijn Huysmans and Johan Swinnen

No 509755, Working Papers of LICOS - Centre for Institutions and Economic Performance from KU Leuven, Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB), LICOS - Centre for Institutions and Economic Performance

Abstract: In this article we study the political process that governs the creation and size of new Geographical Indications (GIs). Producers can choose to apply for a GI and subsequently go through a bargaining process with the government. We derive the optimal GI area from the point of view of consumers, producers, social welfare, and the government; and we show how bargaining leads to a GI size in between the applicant’s optimum and the government’s optimum. Under the assumption that the non-GI good is a commodity, any GI implemented through the political process is welfare-enhancing, but not all welfare-enhancing GIs will be proposed by producers.

Keywords: KUL-METH-Institutions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-09-19
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Published in LICOS - Discussion paper series 372/2015 , pages 1-37

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Related works:
Working Paper: The political economy of geographical indications (2018)
Working Paper: The political economy of geographical indications (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ete:licosp:509755

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