Ordinal Games

Jacques Durieu (), Hans Haller, Nicolas Querou and Philippe Solal
Additional contact information
Jacques Durieu: University of Saint Etienne, France, http://portail.univ-st-etienne.fr/
Hans Haller: Department of Economics, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Blacksburg VA, USA

No 07/74, CER-ETH Economics working paper series from CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich

Abstract: We study strategic games where players' preferences are weak orders which need not admit utility representations. First of all, we ex- tend Voorneveld's concept of best-response potential from cardinal to ordi- nal games and derive the analogue of his characterization result: An ordi- nal game is a best-response potential game if and only if it does not have a best-response cycle. Further, Milgrom and Shannon's concept of quasi- supermodularity is extended from cardinal games to ordinal games. We find that under certain compactness and semicontinuity assumptions, the ordinal Nash equilibria of a quasi-supermodular game form a nonempty complete lattice. Finally, we extend several set-valued solution concepts from cardinal to ordinal games in our sense.

Keywords: Ordinal Games; Potential Games; Quasi-Supermodularity; Rationalizable Sets; Sets Closed under Behavior Correspondences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 50 pages
Date: 2007-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Journal Article: ORDINAL GAMES (2008)
Working Paper: Ordinal Games (2007)
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