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Ordinal Games

Jacques Durieu (), Hans Haller, Nicolas Querou and Philippe Solal
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Jacques Durieu: CREUSET - Centre de Recherche Economique de l'Université de Saint-Etienne - UJM - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne
Hans Haller: Department of economics - Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University [Blacksburg]

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Abstract: We study strategic games where players' preferences are weak orders which need not admit utility representations. First of all, we ex- tend Voorneveld's concept of best-response potential from cardinal to ordi- nal games and derive the analogue of his characterization result: An ordi- nal game is a best-response potential game if and only if it does not have a best-response cycle. Further, Milgrom and Shannon's concept of quasi- supermodularity is extended from cardinal games to ordinal games. We ¯nd that under certain compactness and semicontinuity assumptions, the ordinal Nash equilibria of a quasi-supermodular game form a nonempty complete lattice. Finally, we extend several set-valued solution concepts from cardinal to ordinal games in our sense.

Keywords: Ordinal Games; Potential Games; Quasi-Supermodularity; Rationalizable Sets; Sets Closed under Behavior Correspondences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-10-01
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://ujm.hal.science/ujm-00194794
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

Published in 2007

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Journal Article: ORDINAL GAMES (2008) Downloads
Working Paper: Ordinal Games (2007) Downloads
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