Risk-Sharing, Enforceability, Information and Capital Structure

Y.G. de Lara

Economics Working Papers from European University Institute

Abstract: This paper, instead of focusing on agency cost, analyzes the role of risk-sharing under problems of enforceability (default) to explain the optimal determination of capital structure. Optimal contract structure presents equity and debt.

Keywords: UNCERTAINTY; CAPITAL; CONTRACTS; INSURANCE; INFORMATION; FINANCIAL MARKET; FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D81 D82 G14 G22 G32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 45 pages
Date: 2000
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eui:euiwps:eco2000/5

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