The Impact of Selling Information on Competition

Karl Schlag

Economics Working Papers from European University Institute

Abstract: We consider a homogenous good oligopoly with identical consumers who learn about prices either by (sequentially) visiting firms or by consulting a price agency who sells information about which firm charges the lowest price.

Keywords: MARKET STRUCTURE; PRICES; INFORMATION; COMPETITION (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 D83 L11 L13 L15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29 pages
Date: 2000
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