The Bargaining Family Revisited: A Comment

Atsue Mizushima () and Koichi Futagami

No ECO2007/28, Economics Working Papers from European University Institute

Abstract: This paper reexamines results of Konrad and Lommerud (2000). They construct a two-stage game model of a family. We show that their result crucially depends on their linear payoff function and obtain an opposite result if the interaction within a family is represented by a non-linear function; that is, the interaction exhibits strategic complementarity.

Keywords: public goods; cooperative game; non-cooperative gam (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D13 J24 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eui:euiwps:eco2007/28

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