Andrea Galeotti (),
Matthew Jackson (),
Fernando Vega-Redondo and
No ECO2008/07, Economics Working Papers from European University Institute
In a variety of contexts - ranging from public goods provision to information collection - a player's well-being depends on own action as well as on the actions taken by his or her neighbors. We provide a framework to analyze such strategic interactions when neighborhood structure, modeled in terms of an underlying network of connections, a¤ects payo¤s. We provide results characterizing how the network structure, an individual.s position within the network, the nature of games (strategic substitutes versus complements and positive versus negative externalities), and the level of information, shape individual behavior and payoffs.
Keywords: Networks; Network Games; Graphical Games; Diffusion; Incomplete Information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D85 C72 L14 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-ict, nep-net and nep-soc
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Journal Article: Network Games (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eui:euiwps:eco2008/07
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