The Right Type of Legislator: A Theory of Taxation and Representation

Andrea Mattozzi

No ECO2015/03, Economics Working Papers from European University Institute

Abstract: Theories of taxation conclude that legislators' ability to target redistribution to their districts’ results in higher government spending and taxation. Yet, despite the fact that securing “pork” is an important part of a legislator's job in the U.S., but not in European countries, the U.S. has lower taxes. Our analysis adds a simple assumption to standard models to reconcile them with this fact. Our assumption - that those who are successful in the private sector will also tend to be successful in negotiating transfers for their district - allows our theory to match stylized facts about class representation in legislatures. The model can then be used to examine policies aimed at increasing descriptive representation in legislatures. We find that many of these policies have no, or negative, effects on descriptive representation, including: increasing the number of representatives, allowing parties to choose candidates, or giving parties some ability to discipline legislator's votes and screen candidates. On the other hand, two policies are found to be particularly effective for increasing descriptive representation: proportional representation and limiting competition between legislators.

Keywords: Political Economy; Citizen Candidates; Taxation; Redistribution; Representation; Legislatures (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D02 D63 D72 D78 H10 H23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pbe, nep-pol and nep-pub
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Related works:
Journal Article: The right type of legislator: A theory of taxation and representation (2018)
Working Paper: The Right Type of Legislator: A Theory of Taxation and Representation (2018)
Working Paper: The Right Type of Legislator: a Theory of Taxation and Representation (2017)
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