Signalling Aspects of Managers' Incentives

Sandrine Labory

Economics Working Papers from European University Institute

Abstract: This paper analyses a signalling model of managers' promotion from divisions to the CEO position, in both cases of a monopoly and a duopoly. Explicit and implicit incentives in the presence of asymmetric information are shown to induce managers to increase effort in order to signal high ability to owners, therby raising their probability of promotion.

Keywords: OLIGOPOLIES; INFORMATION; WAGES (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 J33 L13 L21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 38 pages
Date: 1997
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eui:euiwps:eco97/04

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